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Every	Great	Revolution	is	a	Civil	War	
DAVID	ARMITAGE		Originality	 and	 novelty	 define	 the	modern	 script	 of	 revolution.	 That	 script	was	original	in	the	sense	that	it	had	identifiable	beginnings	that	have	been	precisely	located	 in	France	 in	1789	when	 “revolution	was	revolutionised”.	And	 it	was	novel	because	in	that	year	“the	French	imagined	a	radical	break	with	the	past	achieved	by	the	conscious	will	of	human	actors,	an	inaugural	moment	for	a	drama	of	change	and	transformation	projected	indefinitely	into	the	future.”	After	1789,	revolution	in	the	singular	replaced	revolutions	in	the	plural.	What	had	been	understood	before	1789	as	 unavoidable	 features	 of	 nature,	 as	 predetermined	 astronomical	 cycles,	 or	 as	eternal	recurrences	in	human	affairs	became	instead	voluntary,	transformative,	and	repeatable:	revolution	as	fact	gave	way	to	revolution	as	act.	With	that	daring	feat	of	collective	 imagination,	 revolution	 became	 ineluctably	 political,	 covering	 primarily	but	not	exclusively	fundamental	changes	concerned	with	the	distribution	of	power	and	sovereignty.	In	the	years	after	1789,	revolution	also	developed	into	an	authority	in	 its	 own	 right,	 in	 whose	 name	 political	 violence	 could	 be	 legitimated.	 Taken	together,	these	features	made	up	“the	script	for	modern	politics	invented	in	1789”.1	
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These	 elements	 comprised	 the	 originary	 conception	 of	 revolution	 as	 a	process	by	which	the	world	could	be	made	over	again.	 “[E]very	revolution”,	noted	François	Furet,	 “and	above	all	 the	French	Revolution	 itself,	has	 tended	to	perceive	itself	 as	 an	 absolute	 beginning,	 as	 ground	 zero	 of	 history”:	 paradoxically,	 the	uniqueness	of	each	successive	revolution	became	an	 index	of	 its	universality.2	The	modern	script	of	revolution	may	have	been	new	in	1789	but	it	has	been	frequently	replayed	on	stages	around	the	world.	The	authors	of	later	revolutions	adapted	it	to	their	purposes	and	added	new	properties	for	each	performance.	Their	revolutionary	dramas	 borrowed	 lines	 and	 gestures,	 symbols	 and	 costumes,	 from	 previous	productions.	 Such	 borrowings	 could	 constrain	 the	 actors,	 as	 Karl	Marx	 classically	noted	in	the	Eighteenth	Brumaire	of	Louis	Bonaparte:	“Thus	Luther	donned	the	mask	of	the	Apostle	Paul,	the	Revolution	of	1789	to	1814	draped	itself	alternately	as	the	Roman	republic	and	the	Roman	empire,	and	the	Revolution	of	1848	knew	nothing	better	to	do	than	to	parody,	now	1789,	now	the	revolutionary	tradition	of	1793	to	1795.”3	 But	 they	 could	 also	 justify	 revolutionaries’	 actions,	 as	 each	 attempt	 to	overthrow	tradition	contributed	to	the	creation	of	a	new	tradition.	In	this	manner,	from	 1789	 to	 1989	 and	 beyond,	 a	 consciously	 accumulating	 revolutionary	repertoire	came	to	form	the	scarlet	thread	of	modernity	itself.	In	 this	chapter,	 I	want	 to	suggest	 that	 the	modern	revolutionary	script	was	not	 entirely	 original	 or	 novel.	 I	 will	 argue	 instead	 that	 it	 adapted	 a	 much	 older	narrative	 of	 violent	 political	 change.	 That	 script	 also	 depended	 on	 the	 exercise	 of	
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human	 will.	 It	 too	 featured	 contestations	 over	 sovereignty.	 And	 it	 was	 likewise	shadowed	 by	 the	 spectre	 of	 repetition	with	 variation.	 The	 palimpsest	 over	which	self-conscious	revolutionaries	wrote	their	script	was	a	conception	of	history	not	as	a	sequence	 of	 revolutions	 but	 as	 a	 series	 of	 civil	 wars.	 The	 earliest	 version	 of	 this	script	 came	 from	 republican	 Rome	 in	 the	 first	 century	 BCE	 but	 it	 reached	 its	 full	flowering	between	the	first	and	fifth	centuries	CE.	This	originally	Roman	narrative	of	political	violence	informed	the	emerging	scripts	of	revolution	in	the	seventeenth,	eighteenth,	and	nineteenth	centuries.	Traces	of	it	remain	in	the	twenty-first	century,	embedded	 in	 the	 assumptions	 of	 formal	 social	 science	 and	 informal	 political	analysis,	and	in	the	historiography	of	modern	revolutions.4		At	 first	 sight,	 assimilating	 the	 modern	 script	 of	 revolution	 to	 the	 ancient	script	 of	 civil	 war	 might	 seem	 counter-intuitive,	 even	 counter-revolutionary.	 The	two	 forms	 of	 forcible	 political	 transformation	 are	 usually	 assumed	 to	 be	 distinct	both	 morphologically	 and	 genealogically.	 According	 to	 Reinhart	 Koselleck,	revolution	 emerged	 across	 the	 course	 of	 the	 eighteenth	 century	 “as	 a	 concept	 in	contrast	 to	 that	 of	 civil	war.”	 At	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 century,	 he	 argued,	 the	 two	expressions	 “were	 not	 interchangeable,	 but	 were	 not	 at	 the	 same	 time	 mutually	exclusive.”	 Civil	 war	 raised	 memories	 of	 destructive	 confessional	 conflict	 across	Europe,	 the	 very	 kinds	 of	 events	 in	 the	 past	 that	 proponents	 of	 Enlightenment	hoped	to	prevent	in	the	future.	By	contrast,	revolution	would	be	the	leading	edge	of	positive	 transformation	across	 all	 domains	of	human	activity:	 education,	morality,	law,	 politics,	 and	 religion.	 The	 irrational,	 atavistic,	 and	destructive	 activity	 of	 civil	
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war	 would	 wither	 away	 and	 gradually	 become	 impossible.	 A	 practical	 desire	 to	expunge	civil	war	thus	gave	way	to	a	positive	programme	for	promoting	revolution.	The	 result	 was	 the	 final	 separation	 of	 the	 two	 concepts	 by	 the	 late	 eighteenth	century.	“In	many	respects”,	Koselleck	concluded,	“‘civil	war’	had	now	acquired	the	meaning	of	a	senseless	circling	upon	itself,	with	respect	to	which	Revolution	sought	to	open	up	a	new	vista.”5	This	conceptual	opposition	between	revolution	and	civil	war	generated	a	set	of	preconceptions,	even	prejudices,	which	still	endure.	Civil	wars	appear	sterile	and	destructive,	while	revolutions	are	fertile	with	innovation	and	productive	possibility.	Civil	 wars	 hearken	 back	 to	 ancient	 grievances	 and	 deep-dyed	 divisions,	 while	revolutions	point	the	way	toward	an	open	and	expansive	future.	Civil	wars	are	local,	time-bound,	and	rooted	in	history	while	revolutions	have	occurred	across	the	world	in	 a	 universal	 sequence	 of	 human	 liberation.	 Revolutions	mark	 the	 unfolding	 and	realization	of	the	emancipated	human	spirit;	civil	wars	herald	only	its	blighting	and	collapse.	Such	contemporary	conceptions	have	their	own	histories	but	they	should	not	be	projected	back	onto	the	past	as	natural	facts	and	should	be	understood	rather	as	ideological	constructions.	As	self-conscious	revolutionaries	from	Thomas	Paine	to	V.	 I.	 Lenin	 were	 well	 aware,	 the	 scripts	 of	 civil	 war	 and	 revolution	 had	 much	 in	common	and	were	difficult	to	disentangle.	Uncovering	some	of	those	commonalities	will	 be	 the	 task	 of	 the	 second	 part	 of	 this	 chapter;	 firstly,	 however,	 we	 need	 to	
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reconstruct	 the	 classical	 script	 of	 civil	 war	 that	 later	 helped	 to	 shape	 modern	conceptions	 of	 revolution.	 In	 light	 of	 that	 reconstruction,	 the	 reign	 of	 revolution	appears	 to	be	relatively	brief—perhaps	 two	or	 three	centuries	at	most—while	 the	sequence	of	civil	wars	was	much	longer,	stretching	back	over	two	thousand	years.		 The	 Romans	 were	 the	 first	 to	 experience	 political	 violence	 and	 internal	discords	as	civil	wars	because	they	were	the	first	to	conceive	of	them	as	“civil”	even	if	they	were	not	the	first	to	describe	them	as	“wars”.	Such	upheavals	were	civil	in	the	sense	that	they	were	fought	between	fellow	citizens	(cives),	within	the	bounds	of	a	single	political	community.	This	distinguished	them	from	staseis,	the	various	forms	of	 sedition	 and	 rebellion	 that	 divided	 the	Greek	polis	 in	which	 social	 and	political	rupture	was	sometimes	understood	to	be	a	war	(polemos)	but	where	the	community	was	 conceived	 ethnogenetically,	 even	 racially,	 rather	 than	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 common	legal	 or	 political	 status	 as	 citizens.6	 As	 Cicero	 noted	 in	 On	 Duties,	 “among	 the	Athenians	there	were	great	discords	but	in	our	commonwealth	there	were	not	only	seditions	but	even	accursed	civil	wars”	(pestifera	bella	civilia).7	At	least	since	Cicero	himself	had	first	used	the	term,	 in	66	BCE,	 the	Romans	 identified	a	disturbing	and	increasing	number	of	their	conflicts	as	fought	not	against	foreigners,	allies,	pirates,	or	 slaves:	 these	 were	 instead	 wars	 by	 the	 people	 of	 Rome	 against	 the	 people	 of	
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Rome.8	 Because	 the	 standard	 Roman	 conception	 of	war	 defined	 that	 condition	 as	both	 just	 and	 directed	 against	 an	 external	 enemy,	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 civil	war—bellum	
civile—was	 deliberately	 paradoxical,	 even	 oxymoronic.	 It	 was	 nonetheless	 a	distinctively	Roman	invention.	By	general	agreement,	the	first	instance	of	full-blown	bellum	civile	in	Roman	history	had	occurred	in	88	BCE	when	the	consul	Lucius	Cornelius	Sulla	had	marched	on	Rome	 at	 the	 head	 of	 his	 army.	 Sulla	 thereby	 broke	 the	 ultimate	 taboo	 for	 any	Roman	magistrate	or	commander	by	breaching	 the	absolute	 threshold	established	between	the	spheres	of	military	and	civilian	authority,	just	as	Julius	Caesar	would	do	still	more	notoriously	 four	decades	 later,	when	he	crossed	the	river	Rubicon	in	49	BCE.	Sulla’s	opponents,	Gaius	Marius	and	P.	Sulpicius,	confronted	him	with	similar	forces	inside	the	bounds	of	the	city	itself.	At	that	moment,	wrote	the	Greek-speaking	historian	Appian	 in	 the	2nd	century	CE,	 the	peculiar	elements	of	civil	war	could	be	clearly	 seen:	 “there	 took	 place	 a	 struggle	 under	 the	 guise	 of	 civil	 dissension,	 but	nakedly	as	a	war,	complete	with	trumpets	and	military	standards.	…	In	this	way	the	episodes	 of	 civil	 strife	 escalated	 from	 rivalry	 and	 contentiousness	 to	murder,	 and	from	 murder	 to	 full-scale	 war;	 and	 this	 was	 the	 first	 army	 composed	 of	 Roman	citizens	to	attack	their	own	country	as	if	it	were	a	hostile	power.”9	It	may	have	been	the	first,	but	it	would	be	far	from	the	last:	over	the	course	of	almost	a	century,	from	Sulla’s	march	to	the	succession	disputes	following	the	death	of	the	emperor	Nero	in	69	CE,	Rome	would	be	wracked	by	a	series	of	citizens’	wars.	Trumpets	 and	 standards	 were	 the	 visible	 signs,	 conventional	 warfare	 was	 the	
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9 Appian, The Civil Wars (I. 59-60), trans. John Carter (Harmondsworth, 1996) 32-33. 
means,	 and	 control	 of	 the	 city	 of	 Rome	 was	 the	 aim:	 all	 told,	 these	 were	 the	identifying	 marks	 of	 the	 script	 of	 civil	 war	 rather	 than	 signs	 of	 mere	 tumult,	dissension,	or	sedition.	Tumults	and	seditions—like	later	conceptions	of	rebellion	or	revolt,	for	instance—implied	to	the	Romans	episodic	and	non-recurrent	expressions	of	political	violence.	Civil	wars,	by	contrast,	increasingly	came	to	appear	sequential	and	cumulative	across	the	course	of	Roman	history.	Sulla’s	first	war	against	Marius	in	88-87	BCE	led	to	a	second	in	82-81	BCE.	Catiline’s	conspiracy	was	quashed	before	Caesar	had	brought	his	army	from	Gaul	to	confront	Pompey.	That	led	in	turn	to	the	cycle	 of	 intermittent	 and	 transnational	 violence	 that	 spanned	 the	 Mediterranean	(and	beyond)	in	the	years	from	49-31	BCE.	In	these	decades,	it	became	increasingly	easy	 to	 believe	 that	 Rome	 was	 cursed	 by	 civil	 war,	 and	 that	 it	 was	 doomed	 to	reiterate	 citizens’	 conflicts	 cumulatively	and	endlessly	 in	a	deadly	and	debilitating	series.10	After	 the	death	of	Augustus,	 the	cycle	of	civil	war–and	the	sequence	of	civil	war	writing–remained	unbroken.	Of	making	books	about	civil	war,	there	would	be	no	 end.	 The	 greatest	 surviving	 treatments	 of	 Rome’s	 civil	 wars	 were	 written	between	the	60s	and	the	160s	AD:	most	notable	were	Lucan’s	epic	poem,	the	Bellum	
Civile	 (60-65),	 Tacitus’s	Histories	 (c.	 109),	 Plutarch’s	 Roman	 lives	 of	 the	 Gracchi,	Marius,	Sulla,	Caesar,	Pompey	and	Antony	(c.	100-25),	Florus’s	Epitome	 (c.	117-38	or	 161-69),	 and	 the	 surviving	 books	 of	 Appian’s	Roman	 History	 treating	 the	 Civil	
Wars	(c.	145-65).	Tacitus	covered	the	wars	of	succession	that	followed	the	death	of	
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the	emperor	Nero,	in	the	so-called	Year	of	the	Four	Emperors	(69),	which	he	opened	with	a	warning:	“I	am	entering	on	a	work	full	of	disasters,	terrible	in	its	battles,	riven	by	seditions,	in	which	even	peace	was	savage.	Four	emperors	were	cut	down	by	the	sword;	there	were	three	civil	wars,	more	foreign	wars	and	many	that	were	mixed”	(trina	 bella	 civilia,	 plura	 externa,	 ac	 plerumque	 permixta).11	 Florus’s	 Epitome	 told	Rome’s	history	 in	 the	seven	centuries	 from	Romulus	 to	Augustus	as	a	sequence	of	wars,	foreign,	servile,	social,	and	civil.	And	Appian	made	his	comprehensive	attempt	to	encompass	all	Rome’s	civil	wars	from	Sulla	to	Octavian	in	the	surviving	books	of	his	 Roman	 History.	 Their	 accounts	 formed	 the	 matter	 of	 Rome’s	 civil	 wars	 into	sequences	 both	 genealogical	 and	 teleological	 that	 probed	 Romans’	 moral	 failings,	diagnosed	 civil	 war	 as	 the	 city’s	 seemingly	 unshakeable	 curse,	 and	 prescribed	remedies	for	the	disease	or	condemned	its	victims.	Civil	 wars	 appeared	 to	 be	 successive	 and	 cumulative	 across	 the	 course	 of	Roman	history.	They	came	not	singly	but	in	battalions,	and	left	wounds	that	would	not	heal,	heirs	who	demanded	vengeance,	and	divisions	that	split	first	the	city	itself	and	 then	 the	entire	Roman	Empire	 in	 the	Mediterranean	and	beyond.	These	were	unforgettable	 traumas,	 seared	 in	 the	 memory	 and	 likely	 to	 recur	 at	 any	 time.	 A	grieving	 parent	 who	 had	 lived	 through	 Sulla	 and	 Marius’s	 civil	 wars	 and	 then	suffered	 through	Caesar	and	Pompey’s	 contentions	 forty	years	 later	 lamented	 this	cycle	in	Lucan’s	poem,	The	Civil	War:	“These	sufferings	await,	again	to	be	endured,	this	will	 be	 the	 sequence/	 of	 the	warfare,	 this	will	 be	 the	 outcome	 fixed	 for	 civil	
                                                
11 Tacitus, Historiae (I. 2), in Tacitus, Histories, Books I-III, trans. Clifford H. Moore (Cambridge, Mass., 
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strife.”12	This	was	a	sequence	that	looked	like	it	might	become	a	cycle,	a	repetitious	and	 destructive	 series	 of	 events	 that	 closely	 tracked	 and	 decisively	 informed	 the	pivotal	moments	in	Roman	politics.		The	 Roman	 narratives	 of	 civil	 war	 took	 three	 broad	 forms,	 each	 of	 which	would	 inform	 later	 understandings	 of	 internal	 violence	 in	 the	 West	 and	 help	variously	 to	 inspire	 both	 revolutionary	 ideologies	 and	 counterrevolutionary	ideologues.	 First,	 there	 was	 what	 might	 be	 called	 the	 republican	 narrative	 of	seemingly	 endless	 and	 repeated	 civil	wars	 arising	 from	 the	 very	 fabric	 of	 Roman	civilisation	itself:	to	be	civilised	at	all	was	to	be	prone	to	civil	war,	and	to	suffer	one	civil	 war	 opened	 the	 way	 for	 further	 destructive	 dissensions	 within	 the	commonwealth:	 “’Tis	 in	 vain	 to	 seek	 a	 Government	 in	 all	 points	 free	 from	 a	possibility	 of	 Civil	Wars,	 Tumults,	 and	 Seditions”,	 warned	 the	 aristocratic	 English	republican,	Algernon	Sidney,	in	the	early	1680s:	“that	is	a	Blessing	denied	to	this	life,	and	 reserved	 to	 compleat	 the	 Felicity	 of	 the	 next”.13	 Then	 there	 was	 a	 parallel	imperial	or	Augustan	narrative,	which	followed	much	the	same	pattern	but	held	that	the	only	cure	for	the	pathology	of	civil	war	would	be	the	restoration	of	monarchy	or	the	 exaltation	 of	 an	 emperor.	 “In	 this	 way”,	 wrote	 Appian,	 “the	 Roman	 polity	survived	all	 kinds	of	 civil	disturbances	 to	 reach	unity	and	monarchy”:	 “an	evident	demonstration”,	agreed	his	late	sixteenth-century	English	translator,	“That	peoples	rule	 must	 give	 place,	 and	 Princes	 power	 prevayle.”14	 And	 finally	 there	 was	 a	Christian	 narrative,	 constructed	 most	 famously	 by	 Augustine,	 which	 presented	
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Rome’s	 pagan	 history	 as	 a	 catalogue	 of	 “those	 evils	 which	 were	 more	 infernal	because	 internal”	 (quanto	 interiora,	 tanto	 miseriora),	 a	 series	 of	 “civil,	 or	 rather	uncivil,	 discords”	 (discordiae	 civiles	 vel	 potius	 inciviles).	 “How	much	 Roman	 blood	was	 shed,	 and	how	much	of	 Italy	destroyed	and	devastated”,	Augustine	 lamented,	“by	the	Social	War,	Servile	Wars	and	Civil	Wars!”	(bella	socialia,	bella	servilia,	bella	
civilia).	The	contrast	with	that	peaceable	civitas,	 the	City	of	God,	could	hardly	have	been	greater.15	These	narratives	of	civil	war	would	not,	and	could	not,	be	forgotten	as	long	as	the	Roman	historians	and	poets	continued	to	be	read	and	imitated.	There	has	been	much	 debate	 among	 historians	 whether	 books	 made	 revolutions	 in	 the	 early	modern	period,	but	there	can	be	little	doubt	that	civil	conflicts	were	good	for	book	sales.	The	reputations	of	Roman	writers	on	civil	war	closely	tracked	the	prevalence	of	 civil	 conflict.	 Between	 1450	 and	 1700,	 Roman	 historians	 greatly	 outnumbered	their	Greek	predecessors	in	the	number	of	editions	of	their	works:	five	of	the	top	ten	were	 histories	 of	 civil	 war	 or	 by	 historians	 of	 civil	 war,	 as	 Sallust’s	 Catiline	 and	
Jugurtha	 were	 the	 two	 most	 frequently	 printed	 texts,	 with	 Caesar,	 Tacitus,	 and	Florus,	who	portrayed	the	seven	centuries	from	Romulus	to	Augustus	as	a	sequence	of	 wars,	 not	 far	 behind.	 Florus	 became	 a	 mainstay	 of	 early	 modern	 school	 and	university	 curricula:	 editions	 of	 his	 Epitome	 appeared	 almost	 annually	 across	Europe	 during	 the	 eighteenth	 century.	 Through	 his	 text	 and	 that	 of	 his	 fellow	epitomist,	 the	 4th-century	 historian	 Eutropius,	 many	 canonical	 thinkers	 derived	their	first	immersion	in	Roman	history	from	Florus:	Hobbes	knew	his	work	well—it	
                                                
15 Augustine, The City of God against the Pagans, ed. R. W. Dyson (Cambridge, 1998), 132, 929 (III. 23; 
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partly	 inspired	 his	 “Epitome”	 of	 the	 English	 Civil	 Wars,	 Behemoth	 (1679)—and	Locke	would	have	read	him	at	Oxford,	as	Adam	Smith	later	studied	Eutropius.16		Such	synoptic	and	serial	accounts	of	Rome’s	civil	wars	inspired	the	genre	of	European	 historical	 writing	 that	 presented	 the	 histories	 of	 particular	 nations	 or	peoples	 as	 a	 narrative	 of	 their	 “revolutions”—meaning	 their	 external	 invasions,	succession	disputes,	and	civil	wars.	Late	seventeenth-	and	early	eighteenth-century	historians	such	as	Laurence	Echard,	 in	The	Roman	History	 from	the	Building	of	 the	
City	 to	 the	 Perfect	 Settlement	 of	 the	 Empire	 by	 Augustus	 Cæsar	 (1695,	 and	 later	editions),	and	the	abbé	René	Aubert	de	Vertot,	in	his	Histoire	des	révolutions	arrivées	
dans	 le	 gouvernment	 de	 la	 république	 romaine	 (1719,	 and	 later	 editions),	represented	 Roman	 history	 as	 a	 sequence	 of	 disruptive	 “revolutions”	 by	 which	Rome	 had	moved	 over	 the	 centuries	 from	monarchy	 to	 empire	 via	 the	 Republic.	Vertot	capitalized	on	the	success	of	his	Roman	revolutionary	history	with	sequels	on	the	histories	of	 revolutions	 in	Portugal	and	Sweden,	and	his	 imitators	anatomized	revolutions	 throughout	 European	 history	 and	 in	 the	 wider	 Eurasian	 world.17	Throughout	the	life-span	of	this	genre,	civil	wars	were	included	among	the	roster	of	revolutions	and	revolutions	could	not	be	distinguished	conceptually	from	civil	wars.	“Revolutions”	also	became	the	standard	European	description	for	violent	upheavals	
                                                
16 Peter Burke, “A Survey of the Popularity of Ancient Historians, 1450-1700”, History and Theory 5 
(1966), 135-52; Paul Seaward, “Clarendon, Tacitism, and the Civil Wars of Europe”, Huntington Library 
Quarterly 68 (2005), 289-311; Freyja Cox Jensen, “Reading Florus in Early Modern England”, 
Renaissance Studies 23 (2009), 659-77; Jensen, Reading the Roman Republic in Early Modern England 
(Leiden, 2012), 56-73; Thomas Hobbes, Behemoth, ed. Paul Seaward (Oxford, 2010), 52; Statutes of the 
University of Oxford Codified in the Year 1636 under the Authority of Archbishop Laud, ed. John Griffiths 
(Oxford, 1888), 37; Nicholas Phillipson, Adam Smith: An Enlightened Life (London, 2010), 18. 
17 Arnaldo Momigliano, “Ancient History and the Antiquarian”, Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld 
Institutes 13 (1950): 294; Jean Marie Goulemot, Le règne de l’histoire. Discours historiques et révolutions 
XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles (Paris, 1996), 127-56.  
in	Asia,	such	as	the	fall	of	the	Ming	dynasty	in	China	in	1644.	Only	towards	the	end	of	 the	 eighteenth	 century	 did	 Europeans	 cease	 to	 call	 these	 Asian	 struggles	“revolutions”,	as	they	reserved	that	term	for	their	own	political	transformations.18		Most	of	these	histories	of	revolutions	served	absolutist	purposes	by	showing	the	advantages	of	monarchy	over	other	 regimes.19	But	 the	 republican	narrative	of	civil	war	also	survived	to	provide	a	counterpoint	to	the	broadly	Augustan	account	of	the	unsettling	effects	of	revolutions.	In	this	version	of	events,	monarchy	was	not	the	cure	for	political	instability:	it	was	its	cause.	And	civil	war,	like	other	manifestations	of	 revolution,	 might	 therefore	 be	 welcomed	 as	 a	 purge	 rather	 than	 feared	 as	 a	scourge.	As	 the	Commonwealthman	noted	 in	 the	abbé	de	Mably’s	Des	droits	et	des	
devoirs	 du	 citoyen	 (1758),	 the	 oppressors	 of	 society	 have	 a	 magical	 ability	 to	persuade	 their	 citizens	 not	 to	 disturb	 the	 progress	 of	 their	 usurpations	 and	injustices,	“and	that	civil	war,	for	a	people	still	virtuous	enough	to	profit	from	it,	 is	nonetheless	a	greater	scourge	than	the	tyranny	which	threatens	it.”	It	was	the	duty	of	 a	 people—in	 this	 case,	 the	 French	 people—to	 resist	 such	mystifications	 about	both	 tyranny	and	civil	war	and	 to	 follow	 instead	 the	path	of	constitutional	 reform	and	 political	 resistance.	Mably’s	 “script	 for	 a	 French	 revolution”	 therefore	 sprang	from	the	Roman	tradition	of	narrating	history	as	a	sequence	of	civil	wars.	And	it	did	so	 in	 dialogue	 with	 a	 British	 version	 of	 that	 narrative	 whose	 roots	 lay	 in	 the	Exclusion	Crisis	of	the	late	seventeenth	century.	Both	would	come	to	inform	an	early	
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version	of	the	so-called	“democratic	peace”	argument	in	the	late	eighteenth	century	age	of	revolutions—and	civil	wars.20			 The	transformation	of	the	ancient	story	of	civil	war	into	a	modern	script	for	revolution	 began	with	 the	 staunchly	monarchist	writing	 of	 Sir	 Robert	 Filmer	 and	proceeded	via	Algernon	Sidney’s	equally	vehement	republican	refutation	of	Filmer	to	 the	 work	 of	 the	 abbé	 Mably,	 Thomas	 Paine,	 and	 Edmund	 Burke.	 In	 order	 “to	manifest	 the	 Imperfection	 of	 Popular	 Government”,	 Filmer	 in	 his	 Patriarcha	 (c.	1628;	pub.	1680)	had	portrayed	Rome’s	“Democratie”	as	turbulent	and	short-lived:	a	mere	480	years,	 from	the	expulsion	of	Rome’s	 last	king,	Tarquinius	Superbus,	 to	the	rise	of	 Julius	Caesar.	Conflict	between	the	nobility	and	people	 led	 to	seditions;	these	seditions	then	spawned	a	destructive	sequence	of	civil	wars:	“the	Social	War	was	plainly	Civil;	the	Wars	of	the	Slaves,	and	the	other	of	the	Fencers;	the	Civil	Wars	of	Marius	and	Sylla,	of	Cataline,	of	Caesar	and	Pompey	the	Triumvirate,	of	Augustus,	
Lepidus	and	Antonius:	All	these	shed	an	Ocean	of	Blood	within	Italy	and	the	Streets	of	Rome.”	These	wars	continued	even	while	Rome	expanded,	as	 its	citizens	 turned	their	conquering	arms	upon	 themselves,	until	 the	 “Civil	Contentions	at	 last	settled	the	Government	 again	 into	 a	Monarchy.”	To	prove	 the	necessity	 of	monarchy	 and	the	 instability	 of	 “Democratical	 Government”,	 Filmer	 turned	 the	 republican	
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narrative	 of	 civil	 war	 on	 its	 head	 in	 the	 service	 of	 an	 Augustan	 account	 of	 the	benefits	of	monarchy	for	securing	peace.21	Algernon	Sidney	returned	to	 the	Roman	republican	narrative	of	civil	war—and	in	particular	to	Sallust’s	version	of	it—to	refute	Filmer’s	defence	of	patriarchal	monarchy.	He	argued	that	it	was	not	adherence	to	a	republican	constitution	that	had	caused	 Rome’s	 seditions	 and	 ultimately	 its	 civil	 wars:	 it	 was	 straying	 from	 that	constitution	 and	 allowing	 the	 spoils	 of	 empire	 to	 foster	 inequality	 and	 to	 corrupt	private	life.	Sidney	also	took	Filmer	to	task	for	his	overexpansive	application	of	the	term	civil	war:	“’tis	most	absurdly	applied	to	the	servile	and	gladiatorian	Wars;	for	the	Gladiators	were	Slaves	also,	and	Civil	Wars	can	be	made	only	by	those	who	are	Members	 of	 the	 Civil	 Society,	 which	 Slaves	 are	 not.	 Those	 that	 made	 the	 bellum	
Sociale,	were	Freemen,	but	not	Citizens;	and	the	War	they	made	could	not	be	called	Civil.”	 When	 Caesar	 and	 Pompey,	 the	 members	 of	 the	 triumvirate,	 and	 the	 four	emperors	who	followed	Augustus	engaged	in	what	were	rightly	called	“civil”	wars,	their	 armed	 contentions	 could	 not	 be	 used	 to	 discredit	 popular	 government.	 The	civil	 conflicts	 of	 the	 republican	 era	were	 “the	 last	 Struglings	 of	 expiring	 Liberty”,	while	those	under	the	empire,	and	“all	the	Mischiefs	that	accompanied	them,	are	to	be	imputed	wholly	to	the	Monarchy	for	which	they	[Nero,	Galba,	Otho,	Vitellius,	and	Vespasian]	contended.”22		This	 difference	 between	 republican	 and	 monarchical	 government	 was	universal	in	the	Latin	West	not	simply	a	contingent	feature	of	Roman	politics.	Sidney	argued	 that	 “All	 monarchies	 are	 subject	 to	 be	 afflicted	 with	 civil	 wars	 …	 But	
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commonwealths	are	less	troubled	with	those	distempers”:	indeed,	as	the	title	of	his	chapter	 on	 the	 subject	 had	 it,	 “Popular	 Governments	 are	 less	 subject	 to	 Civil	Disorders	than	Monarchies;	manage	them	more	ably,	and	more	easily	recover	out	of	them.”	This	was	in	large	part	because	non-monarchical	regimes	did	not	suffer	from	the	 destructive	 disputes	 over	 inheritance	 and	 the	 succession	 that	 bedevilled	monarchies.	 Sidney	 showed	 this	 distinction	 by	 a	 detailed	 breakdown	 of	 all	 the	violent	 disturbances	 across	 history:	 in	 Israel	 under	 its	 kings,	 in	 the	 Persian	monarchy,	in	Rome,	France,	Spain,	and	Britain.	For	example,	the	succession	caused	“many	Revolutions”	in	France	where,	as	in	Rome,	“the	end	of	one	Civil	War	has	bin	the	beginning	of	another.”	As	 if	 the	pages	of	evidence	from	the	Mediterranean	and	northern	Europe	were	not	enough	 to	convince	his	 readers,	Sidney	concluded	with	the	 litany	of	 civil	wars	 that	had	scarred	England	since	 the	Norman	Conquest:	 “the	Miseries	of	England	on	 like	occasions”,	he	wrote,	“surpass	all”.	From	the	contested	succession	after	 the	death	of	William	the	Conqueror	to	the	troubles	of	 the	Tudors,	English	 history	 appeared	 to	 be	 an	 almost	 continuous	 time	 of	 troubles	 for	 five	centuries.23	What	more	 could	 be	 needed	 to	 show	 that	 it	was	monarchy	 that	 bred	war,	and	republicanism	that	brought	peace,	in	the	ancient	world	as	in	the	modern?	The	most	 incendiary	 use	 of	 this	 argument	was	Thomas	Paine’s	 in	Common	
Sense	 (1776).	Writing	 in	 Philadelphia	 in	 January	 1776,	 Paine	 sought	 to	 shake	 his	colonial	 readers	 out	 of	 their	 complacent	British	monarchism	by	 linking	 a	 plea	 for	republican	 government	with	 his	 larger	 argument	 in	 favour	 of	 independence	 from	Great	 Britain.	 He	 contrasted	 his	 own	 attachment	 to	 republicanism	 with	 what	 he	
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called	the	“most	plausible	plea,	which	hath	ever	been	offered	in	favour	of	hereditary	succession”,	 in	 a	passage	 that	hewed	 closely	 to	 Sidney’s	 arguments	 from	almost	 a	century	earlier,	not	 least	by	recalling	 the	claims	of	Filmerian	patriarchalists.	Their	justification	for	monarchy	was		that	 it	 preserves	 a	 Nation	 from	 civil	wars;	 and	were	 this	 true,	 it	would	 be	weighty;	 whereas,	 it	 is	 the	 most	 barefaced	 falsity	 ever	 imposed	 upon	mankind.	 The	whole	 history	 of	 England	 disowns	 the	 fact.	 Thirty	 kings	 and	two	minors	have	 reigned	 in	 that	 distracted	kingdom	since	 the	 conquest,	 in	which	 time	 there	 have	 been	 (including	 the	 [Glorious]	 Revolution)	 no	 less	than	eight	civil	wars	and	nineteen	Rebellions.	Wherefore	 instead	of	making	for	peace,	 it	makes	against	 it,	 and	destroys	 the	very	 foundation	 it	 seems	 to	stand	 on.	 …	 In	 short,	 monarchy	 and	 succession	 have	 laid	 (not	 this	 or	 that	kingdom	only)	but	the	world	in	blood	and	ashes.24		 Paine	went	beyond	Sidney—who	had	been	executed	in	1683—by	adding	the	Glorious	Revolution	to	the	list	of	England’s	troubles,	and	by	inference	to	its	roster	of	civil	wars.	1688-89	was	a	year	of	two	kings,	and	thereby	no	doubt	only	half	as	bad	as	the	year	of	the	four	emperors	chronicled	by	Tacitus	in	his	Histories.	Far	from	being	the	upheaval	that	secured	the	recovery	of	England’s	“civil	and	political	liberties”	(as	Sir	William	Blackstone	 had	 described	 it),	 the	 Glorious	Revolution	was	 simply	 one	more	 example	 of	 how	 a	 contested	 succession	 could	 lead	 to	 national	 instability,	setting	 citizens	 against	 citizens	 in	 their	 quest	 to	 affirm	 their	 monarchical	subjecthood.25	Most	wrenchingly	of	all,	it	was	part	of	a	narrative	of	successive	civil	wars	 like	 that	 traced	by	Tacitus	and	other	Roman	historians.	Yet	 the	cure	 for	civil	war	was	not,	as	the	pro-Augustan	writers	and	their	heirs	asserted,	the	imposition	of	monarchy.	It	was	instead	what	Sidney	and	his	readers,	like	the	Commonwealthman	
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in	Mably’s	Des	droits	et	des	devoirs	du	citoyen,	had	recommended:	namely,	popular	government	rather	than	hereditary	succession.	Paine	would	not	be	alone	in	identifying	the	Glorious	Revolution	as	a	civil	war.	Writing	almost	fifteen	years	after	him	in	1790,	Edmund	Burke	noted	acidly	that	the	“ceremony	of	cashiering	kings”	…	can	rarely,	 if	ever,	be	performed	without	 force.	 It	 then	becomes	a	case	of	war,	 and	 not	 of	 constitution.	 Laws	 are	 commanded	 to	 hold	 their	 tongues	against	 arms,	 and	 tribunals	 fall	 to	 the	 ground	 with	 the	 peace	 they	 are	 no	longer	able	to	uphold.	The	Revolution	of	1688	was	obtained	by	a	just	war,	in	the	only	case	in	which	any	war,	and	much	more	a	civil	war,	can	be	just.	Justa	
bella	quibus	necessaria.26		Why	did	these	events	constitute	a	“civil”	war?	Possibly	Burke	wrote	here	as	an	Irishman	rather	than	an	English	politician	by	recalling	the	conflict	between	James	II	and	William	III	on	his	native	soil	and	its	enduring	consequences	for	Ireland.	In	this	light,	the	Glorious	Revolution	was	“not	a	revolution,	but	a	conquest;	which	is	not	to	say	a	great	deal	in	its	favour”.27	Or	Burke	may	have	remembered	the	English	side	of	the	Revolution	as	an	invasion	by	one	claimant	to	the	thrones	of	the	Three	Kingdoms,	backed	by	force	and	his	English	supporters,	against	another.	Either	way,	he	made	an	essentially	Lockean	argument	for	the	exceptionality	of	what	had	happened	in	1688.	Dethroning	a	monarch	could	not	be	regulated	by	law	or	determined	by	right:	it	was	a	question	of	armed	necessity	and	hence	of	war.	And	because	it	was	fought	between	members	of	the	same	polity,	it	was	by	definition	civil.	
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Paine	and	Burke	saw	the	events	of	1688-89	as	both	a	revolution–indeed,	as	
the	Revolution,	the	only	one	up	to	that	point	in	British	and	Irish	history–and	a	civil	war:	a	just	war,	in	Burke’s	case,	an	unjust	war	in	Paine’s.	If	Paine	had	been	right	in	1776,	 then	 the	 Glorious	 Revolution	 was	 the	 culmination	 of	 a	 series	 of	 unsettling	contentions	 over	 the	 succession,	with	 1688	 as	 a	 year	 of	 two	 kings	 to	 parallel	 the	year	 of	 the	 four	Emperors	 chronicled	by	Tacitus	 in	his	Histories.	 Yet	 if	Burke	was	correct	 in	 1790,	 then	 the	 Glorious	 Revolution	was	 an	 unrepeatable	 exception,	 an	extreme	example	of	necessity,	and	not	 the	 inevitable	recurrence	of	an	 inescapable	sequence:	 it	was	a	civil	war	that	transcended	the	repetitive	compulsions	predicted	by	 Roman	 narratives.	 Despite	 these	 fundamental	 differences,	 Paine	 and	 Burke’s	identifications	 of	 the	 Glorious	Revolution	 as	 a	 civil	war	 give	 the	 lie	 to	 Koselleck’s	argument	that	revolution	and	civil	war	had	separated	semantically	and	conceptually	by	the	end	of	the	eighteenth	century.	Even	in	the	Age	of	Revolutions	they	were	not	mutually	exclusive,	even	if	not	entirely	interchangeable.	And	 so,	 indeed,	 they	 remained	 long	 after	 the	 late	 eighteenth	 century.28	Revolutionaries	 redescribed	what	 in	other	 circumstances–or	by	other	 ideologues–had	 been	 called	 rebellions,	 insurrections	 or	 civil	 wars.	 Indeed,	 one	 sure	 sign	 of	 a	revolution’s	success	is	precisely	that	retrospective	redescription.	The	renaming	can	happen	 relatively	quickly:	 for	 example,	 the	 transatlantic	 conflict	 of	 the	1770s	 that	many	contemporaries	saw	as	a	British	“civil	war”	or	even	“the	American	Civil	War”	was	 first	 called	 “the	 American	 Revolution”	 in	 1776	 by	 the	 chief	 justice	 of	 South	
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Carolina,	William	Henry	Drayton.29	The	rebranding	can	also	come	more	slowly,	as	when	the	French	historian	François	Guizot	became	among	the	 first	 in	1826	to	call	the	 mid-seventeenth-century	 crisis	 in	 Britain	 the	 “English	 Revolution”,	 on	 the	grounds	 that	 “the	 analogy	 of	 the	 two	 revolutions	 is	 such	 that	 [the	English]	would	never	have	been	understood	had	not	[the	French]	taken	place.”30	As	the	English	poet	Sir	John	Harington	might	have	put	it	in	one	of	his	late	sixteenth-century	epigrams:	Civil	war	doth	never	prosper:	what’s	the	solution?	For	if	it	prosper,	it’s	called	revolution.31		To	recover	the	modern	script	of	revolution,	we	need	to	be	alert	to	the	scripts	of	civil	war	revolutionaries	followed	and	subsequently	attempted	to	efface	or	deny.	Inspiration	 for	 this	 task	 comes	 from	 some	 of	 the	 greatest	 theorists	 of	 revolution	themselves.	In	The	Communist	Manifesto,	Marx	and	Engels	noted	that,	“[i]n	depicting	the	most	general	phases	of	the	development	of	the	proletariat,	we	traced	the	more	or	 less	 veiled	 civil	 war	 [den	 mehr	 oder	 minder	 versteckten	 Bürgerkrieg],	 raging	within	 existing	 society,	 up	 to	 the	 point	 where	 that	 war	 breaks	 out	 into	 open	revolution.”32	 Similarly,	 Lenin	 argued	 in	 1917	 that	 “civil	 wars	 …	 in	 every	 class	society	 are	 the	 natural,	 and	 under	 certain	 conditions,	 inevitable	 continuation,	development	and	 intensification	of	 the	 class	 struggle.	That	has	been	confirmed	by	
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every	 great	 revolution.”33	 Looking	 back	 on	 the	Russian	Revolution	 a	 decade	 later,	Stalin	agreed:	 “the	seizure	of	power	by	 the	proletariat	 in	1917	was	a	 form	of	civil	war.”34	There	is	now	considerable	evidence	in	the	literature	on	revolutions	that	civil	war	was	an	actors’	category,	as	well	as	a	revealing	analytical	optic	for	evaluating	the	causes,	 course	 and	 consequences	 of	 such	 events	 as	 the	 American,	 French,	 and	Spanish	American	“revolutions”.35	In	light	of	this,	when	tracing	the	genealogy	of	the	modern	script	of	revolution,	we	should	seriously	consider	the	hypothesis	that	civil	war	was	the	original	genus	of	which	revolution	was	only	a	late-evolving	species.36	
                                                
33 V. I. Lenin, The Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution (September 1916), in Lenin, 
Collected Works, 45 vols. (Moscow, 1960-70), XXIII, 78. 
34 Josef Stalin (1928), quoted in Alfred J. Rieber, “Civil Wars in the Soviet Union”, Kritika 4 (2003), 140. 
35 See, for example, Wim Klooster, Revolutions in the Atlantic World: A Comparative History (New York, 
2009), 11–44; Maya Jasanoff, Liberty’s Exiles: American Loyalists in the Revolutionary World (New York, 
2011), 21–53; Alan Taylor, The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, and 
Indian Allies (New York, 2010); Jean-Clément Martin, La Vendée et la Révolution (Paris, 2007); David 
Andress, The Terror: Civil War in the French Revolution (London, 2005); Manuel Lucena Giraldo, 
Naciones de rebeldes. Las revoluciones de independencia latinoamericanas (Madrid, 2010); Tomás Pérez 
Vejo, Elegía criolla. Una reinterpretación de las guerras de independencia hispanoamericanas (México, 
D.F., 2010). 
36 Pace Pierre Serna, “Toute révolution est guerre d’independance”, in Jean-Luc Chappey, Bernard Gainot, 
Guillaume Mazeau, Frédéric Régent, and Pierre Serna, Pour quoi faire la Révolution (Marseille, 2012), 19-
49; Serna, “Every Revolution is a War of Independence”, in Suzanne Desan, Lynn Hunt, and William Max 
Nelson, eds., The French Revolution in Global Context (Ithaca, NY, 2013), 165-82.  
 
DAVID	 ARMITAGE	 is	 the	 Lloyd	 C.	 Blankfein	 Professor	 of	 History	at	 Harvard	University,	where	he	 teaches	 intellectual	history	and	 international	history.	Among	his	fourteen	books	to	date	are,	as	author,	The	Declaration	of	Independence:	A	Global	
History	 (2007),	 and	 Foundations	 of	 Modern	 International	 Thought	 (2013),	 as	 co-author,	The	 History	Manifesto	 (2014),	 and,	 as	 co-editor,	The	 Age	 of	 Revolutions	 in	
Global	Context,	c.	1760-1840	(2010)	and	Pacific	Histories:	Ocean,	Land,	People	(2014).	
 
